Goodwill under IFRS: Relevance and disclosures in an unfavorable environment by Baboukardos, Diogenis & Rimmel, Gunnar
 1 















Accepted for publication in  
Accounting Forum  
Baboukardos, D. and Rimmel, G. (2014)  
Goodwill under IFRS: Relevance and disclosures in an unfavorable environment. 




















* Corresponding author 
 2 




The accounting treatment of purchased goodwill under IFRS has been severely criticized due to the 
extensive use of fair value accounting. The purpose of this study is to enrich the ongoing debate upon 
this issue by drawing attention to the market valuation implications of goodwill in a country outside 
the Anglo-Saxon accounting paradigm, where the application of fair value accounting has been seen 
as more problematic. The results indicate that, in the case of purchased goodwill, fair value accounting 
generates relevant accounting numbers but only in companies that comply highly with IFRS 
disclosure requirements. 
 
Keywords: Goodwill, value relevance, fair value accounting, mandatory disclosures, IFRS, Greece 
 
Abbreviations 
ASE Athens Stock Exchange 
FVA Fair Value Accounting 
IFRS International Financial Reporting Standards 




The controversial nature of purchased goodwill has been puzzling accounting practitioners and 
scholars for more than a century. Since the end of the nineteenth century, accountants have been 
struggling to find the most appropriate accounting treatment for the pecuniary difference between the 
consideration transferred for acquiring a business and the acquiree’s value (Cooper, 2007). Miller 
(1973) commends on this issue: 
“The term ‘goodwill’ is necessary for the accountant because he attempts to disaggregate the 
purchase price for an organized whole only by isolation of elements which are classifiable 
according to traditional accounting procedure and which can be valued arbitrarily in terms of 
some historic costs or external market values” (Miller, 1973, p.285). 
Even though little has changed regarding the recognition criteria for goodwill since Miller’s 
commentary, the recent adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by more than 
120 countries has reignited the controversy regarding the measurement of purchased goodwill due to 
the extensive use of fair value accounting (FVA). FVA is said to have desirable but also questionable 
attributes. On the one hand, fair value is considered a superior economic measure in comparison with 
historical cost, but on the other hand, it may lead to valuation failures, mainly in cases in which ‘mark 
to model’ estimations are employed (Ball, 2006; Franklin & Carletti, 2008; Penman, 2007). Goodwill 
accounting is heavily influenced by FVA both at goodwill’s initial recognition and measurement 
under IFRS 3 as well as at its subsequent annual impairment test under IAS 36. As a consequence, 
purchased goodwill is found in the center of the criticism for FVA (Ramanna, 2008; Sevin & 
Schroeder, 2005; Wines et al. 2007). For instance, Wines et al. (2007) criticize the new accounting 
treatment of goodwill as highly subjective and with potential negative implications for financial 
reporting. In addition, Beisland (2013) argues that if fair values for certain assets are not easily 
accessible, then it is very possible that companies’ market valuation will be hindered (and not 
 3 
facilitated) by FVA. Similarly, Ball (2006) notes that in countries that depart from the economic and 
legal environment of the so-called Anglo-Saxon countries, there is a higher probability of problems 
with ‘mark to model’ estimates occurring due to these countries’ unfavorable institutional 
environments and accounting traditions. In such settings, the relevance of accounting numbers 
influenced by FVA is questionable and worthy of examination. 
Whether these concerns are valid remains an open empirical question, as there is no clear evidence 
of the market valuation implications of assets that are heavily influenced by FVA under IFRS, 
especially in unfavorable environments for the application of the new Standards. With regard to 
goodwill, its market valuation implications have mainly been examined in Anglo-Saxon accounting 
settings, where local accounting standards present many similarities to IFRS. However, there is no 
clear evidence concerning this issue in unfavorable (for the implementation of IFRS) environments. 
This study attempts to shed some light upon this empirical issue. Specifically, it examines the value 
relevance of purchased goodwill under IFRS in a number of companies listed on the Athens Stock 
Exchange (ASE). Greece can be classified as an unfavorable environment because it is a code-law 
Continental European country with a stakeholder-oriented and taxation-driven national accounting 
system (Ballas et al., 1998; Nobes, 2008). In addition, because Greece is a low-trust society, its 
accounting environment is highly formalistic; hence, the use of FVA is limited in favor of historical 
cost accounting. Thus, the consequences of the application of the new Standards, especially those that 
are heavily influenced by FVA, on the market valuation of accounting numbers are questionable. 
Another important consequence of the highly formalistic accounting environment in Greece is the 
absence of extensive supplementary disclosure requirements. The local accounting standards do not 
leave much space for management discretion; thus, there is no need for mandating detailed 
disclosures. The mandatory implementation of IFRS by all listed companies in 2005, however, has 
vastly changed the reporting landscape. The new Standards leave much more space for management 
discretion (especially where FVA is applied); hence, there is a need for the justification of 
management decisions. This need is claimed to be covered by the mandating of voluminous 
disclosures by IFRS. 
Despite the allegedly important role of mandatory disclosures, there is a lack of empirical studies on 
their valuation implications. This study corresponds to the calls for further research on the field of 
mandatory disclosures (Leuz & Wysocki, 2008; Schipper, 2007; Zéghal & Maaloul, 2011) [12,13,14] 
by examining whether companies’ decisions to comply to a greater or lesser extent with the IFRS 
disclosure requirements for goodwill bears any impact on the value relevance of their purchased 
goodwill. 
Some European evidence shows that the value relevance of net income is significantly higher for 
companies that comply highly with IFRS disclosure requirements than for those that do not 
(Paananen, 2008; Tsalavoutas & Dionysiou, 2013). On the contrary, the same studies find that the 
value relevance of balance sheet items at an aggregated level (that is, the book value of shareholders’ 
equity) does not differ between companies that comply with IFRS disclosure requirements to a greater 
extent and those that comply to a lesser extent. 
Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that the market valuation implications of specific balance 
sheet items that are heavily influenced by FVA might differ. The main reason is as follows. For 
accounting items heavily influenced by FVA, explanatory disclosures are of high importance because 
the accounting treatment of these items does not follow detailed rules but is strongly based on 
managerial decisions. These decisions are primarily related to assumptions, forecasts and projections 
about the future and need to be justified. The insufficient justification of the management’s decisions 
may lead to accounting numbers of low reliability and therefore low value relevance. Otherwise, the 
extensive disclosure requirements of IFRS seem to have no impact on accounting items’ valuation 
implications, allowing their usefulness to be questioned.  
The present study attempts to enrich our understanding of mandatory disclosures focusing on IFRS 
disclosures for goodwill. Specifically, using two different approaches for measuring the level of 
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compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosure requirements for goodwill, this study examines whether 
goodwill’s value relevance differs between companies with relatively high and low levels of 
compliance. 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. The next section describes the Greek accounting 
environment and justifies why it can be characterized as unfavorable for the application of IFRS. 
Subsequently, prior studies are discussed to develop the tested hypotheses. The research design is 
then illustrated, and the company selection procedure is outlined. The data are described and the 
empirical analyses are presented in the next section. Finally, conclusions are drawn. 
 
2. Implementing IFRS in an unfavorable environment  
Greece is classified as a code-law Continental European country with a stakeholder-oriented and 
taxation-driven national accounting system (Ballas et al., 1998; Nobes, 2008; Nobes 2011). Similar 
to most Continental European domestic accounting standards, under Greek accounting standards, the 
use of FVA is limited in favor of historical cost accounting. Hence, it can be characterized as an 
unfavorable environment for the implementation of IFRS and the application of FVA in particular. 
Greece’s domestic accounting standards are mainly influenced by the French accounting system and 
the European Union’s legislation (namely, the Fourth and Seventh EU Directives), which differ 
substantially from IFRS (Ding et al., 2007). Specifically, Bae et al. (2008) provide evidence that 
among the 15 oldest member states of the European Union, Greece presents the second largest 
difference between its national accounting standards and IFRS.  
One of the most characteristic examples of the differences between IFRS and Greek accounting 
standards can be found in the accounting treatment of purchased goodwill. Accounting for goodwill 
under IFRS is heavily influenced by FVA both at the initial recognition and measurement of goodwill 
under IFRS 3 and at its subsequent impairment test under IAS 36. The only acceptable method for 
the accounting treatment of business combinations recognized by IFRS 3 is the so-called acquisition 
(or purchase) method, which, unlike the pooling of interest method, requires the fair valuation of the 
acquirer’s transferred consideration (including other previously held interests) as well as that of the 
acquiree’s identifiable net assets. If the value of the transferred consideration is larger than that of the 
identifiable net assets, the difference is recognized in the new entity’s statement of financial position 
as goodwill and is subject to an (at least) annual impairment test according to IAS 36. Otherwise, the 
difference is recognized as a bargain purchase in the statement of comprehensive income.  
Greek accounting regulation recognizes the acquisition method as the primary method for business 
combinations; however, it requires the application of pooling of interest method under specific 
conditions. In particular, Codified Companies’ Law 2190/20 (par. 68-80) identifies two basic methods 
for achieving a business combination: mergers and acquisitions. A merger can be realized by either 
consolidating the merging entities into a new entity or retaining one of the merging entities, which 
eventually ‘absorbs’ the assets and liabilities of the ‘absorbed’ entities. Moreover, a business 
combination is identified as an acquisition when the acquiring entity purchases the whole of the target 
entity or when the acquiring entity acts as a holding company by purchasing sufficient stock to gain 
control of the target entity. In all of these cases, the acquisition method should be employed whilst 
the valuation of combined entities’ assets and liabilities is carried out by a special committee of 
external, independent valuators convened by the local prefecture authorities. If the value of the cost 
of the combination is higher than the net value of the assets resulting from the committee’s valuation, 
the difference is recognized as goodwill.  
Unlike IFRS, under Greek accounting regulation, goodwill shall be amortized in a period of no more 
than five years. Table 1 compares the valuation methods employed in business combinations 
accounted by the acquisition method under IFRS and Greek accounting regulation. Whereas the 
domination of fair values is prominent under IFRS, the approach adopted under Greek regulation is 
by far more prudent, as it permits the valuation of most balance sheet items at market values so long 
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as the market values are lower than the respective historical costs. An important exception to this rule 
is the valuation method of tangible assets, which, similar to IFRS 3, calls for recognition of tangible 
assets at current values.  
Finally, it should be stressed that when a business combination is realized under Law 2166/93 (and 
not under the basic Companies’ Law 2190/20), the combined entities are required to apply the pooling 
of interest method and hence recognize their assets and liabilities at book values. Consequently, under 
this law, it is not feasible to recognize goodwill. It is worth mentioning that Law 2166/93 is another 
example of the substantial influence of tax regulation on financial reporting in Greece, as the 
motivation for the application of the pooling of interest method requirement is the exceptionally 
favorable tax benefits offered by the law.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
In addition to the origins of Greek accounting standards, another important reason for classifying 
Greece as an unfavorable environment for the implementation of IFRS is the absence of trust between 
the Greek state and its citizens as well as amongst citizens (Ballas et al., 1998). The absence of trust 
has been diachronically playing a key role in the development of detailed accounting rules, which 
virtually hinder companies to report their fundamentals in a true and fair view for the sake of 
formalism: 
“It (A/N: Formalism) provides reporting entities with ground rules on what is ‘acceptable’ in 
a manner which can be communicated easily without having to document why a specific 
alternative (disclosure, valuation rules, etc.) is preferred” (Ballas et al., 1998, p. 279). 
Under Greek accounting standards, companies have to follow very specific rules that leave little space 
for management discretion. As a corollary, Greek regulation mandates far fewer disclosures than 
IFRS because companies do not have to clarify how they come up with their figures; the rules are 
detailed and unquestionable, and the emphasis is placed on providing hard figures (Ballas, 1994). 
In 2005, all listed companies on the ASE had to abandon the established unwritten ‘rule of formality’ 
and adopt principle-based accounting standards that call for extensive use of FVA where the role of 
management discretion is crucial. For that reason, and unlike Greek accounting rules, IFRS calls for 
voluminous disclosures that justify management’s decisions. Nevertheless, it is largely questionable 
whether the inherent subjectivity of FVA has been welcome in unfavorable environments such as 
Greece. Ball (2006), discussing the implementation of IFRS in Continental European countries, notes 
that “It remains to be seen if managers, auditors, regulators and other monitors outside of the 
common-law countries will be persuaded by IFRS adoption that it is in their interests to radically 
change their behavior” (Ball, 2006, p. 17). Preliminary evidence from Greece is not very 
encouraging. Karampinis and Hevas (2011) compare earnings’ value relevance and conditional 
conservatism between the last three years of the application of Greek accounting standards and the 
first three years of IFRS implementation in ASE and find insufficient evidence of improvements in 
these accounting properties after the mandatory adoption of IFRS. Hence, it can be inferred that 
Greece remains an unfavorable environment for the implementation of IFRS. 
 
3. Literature review and hypothesis development 
Several studies examine the value relevance of purchased goodwill (Eckstein, 2004; El-Tawy & 
Tollington, 2013). Nevertheless, almost all of these studies investigate the phenomenon in Anglo-
Saxon accounting settings (mainly in Australia and the US). Specifically, Chauvin and Hirschey 
(1994), Jennings et al. (1996) and McCarthy and Schneider (1995) find a strong positive association 
between goodwill and US firms’ market value. Bugeja and Gallery (2006), Dahmash et al. (2009) 
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and Ritter and Wells (2006) conclude that Australian firms’ market value is influenced positively by 
goodwill. Furthermore, Chalmers et al. (2008) find that, overall, goodwill’s value relevance was 
enhanced after the adoption of Australian IFRS equivalents in 2005 relative to Australian GAAP. 
Ojala (2007) finds that under Finnish GAAP, goodwill was value relevant, especially when 
companies applied a short amortization period. Jifri and Citron (2009) examine whether goodwill had 
similar information value when it was disclosed in the supplementary notes and when it was 
recognized in the UK firm’s financial statements under UK FRS. They find that both recognized 
goodwill and disclosures about goodwill were value relevant. 
The almost total absence of studies outside the Anglo-Saxon accounting paradigm raises the question 
of whether the results of these studies are applicable to countries with different accounting paradigms, 
especially after the mandatory adoption of IFRS by these countries.  
With reference to Greece, listed companies on the ASE declare that the adoption of IFRS improved 
the relevance of their financial statements (Ballas et al., 2010). However, the empirical evidence 
regarding this issue is mixed. Iatridis and Rouvolis (2010) find that the book value of equity and net 
profit of companies listed on the ASE were more value relevant in the first two years of mandatory 
implementation of IFRS than in 2004, the last year of the application of Greek accounting standards. 
On the contrary, Karampinis and Hevas (2011) conclude that IFRS adoption only has minimal effects 
on accounting numbers’ value relevance. 
Greece is an interesting setting for the examination of purchased goodwill’s value relevance. As 
discussed in the previous section, Greece is regarded as an unfavorable environment for the 
application of IFRS due to its Continental European accounting tradition as well as its companies’ 
formalistic behavior (Ballas et al., 1998). In addition, IFRS calls for an accounting treatment of 
goodwill that has raised many objections (Ramanna, 2008; Sevin & Schroeder, 2005; Wines et al. 
2007). For example, Wines et al. (2007) stress that the new accounting treatment of goodwill “is 
fraught with subjectivity and ambiguity for financial report preparers and auditors, and potentially 
has serious impacts on financial reports” (Wines et al., 2007, p. 863). Taking into account that these 
objections are primarily derived from countries with long traditions in accounting systems similar to 
IFRS (i.e., the so-called Anglo-Saxon, common-law countries), it can be assumed that participants in 
markets with the characteristics of the Greek market may have even greater concerns about goodwill 
and similar accounting numbers.  
Ball (2006) raises this issue, noting that in countries that depart from the economic and legal 
environment of the ‘G4+1’ common-law countries (i.e., Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and 
the US) the implementation of IFRS fair value accounting will lead to difficulties with illiquidity, 
wide spreads and subjectivity in 'mark to model' estimates of fair value. These problems may affect 
the relevance of accounting information. Hence, it is useful to examine whether the ‘fair valuation’ 
of goodwill under IFRS in an unfavorable environment for the application of IFRS leads to relevant 
information. The first hypothesis this study examines is 
 
H1: Purchased goodwill under IFRS is value relevant. 
 
Additionally, the present study addresses the call for further research in the field of mandatory 
disclosures (Leuz & Wysocki, 2008; Schipper, 2007). Despite the allegedly important role of 
mandatory disclosures, there is a lack of studies on their valuation implications. Schipper (2007) 
notes, 
“Despite their abundance, required disclosures are not well understood: we lack a 
comprehensive theory of mandatory disclosures; many questions remain as to how preparers, 
auditors, and users of financial reports view disclosures...” (Schipper, 2007, p. 301) 
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Hassan et al. (2006) argue that one of the reasons that little attention has been given to mandatory 
disclosures is that most studies are conducted in developed markets with strong enforcement 
mechanisms, which ensure a high level of compliance with mandatory disclosures by almost all 
companies. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the excessive disclosure requirements mandated by 
IFRS are not fully followed in even some of the most developed markets.  
The 2009 report for the European Enforcement Coordination Sessions (EECS) of the then Committee 
of European Securities Regulators1 (CESR) notes that although the overall quality of IFRS reporting 
in Europe had improved by 2009, “financial reports varied considerably in the extent to which issuers 
disclosed clearly, consistently and sufficiently comprehensively, the main judgments made in the 
preparation of financial statements” (CESR, 2009, pp. 11-12). Two of the key issues discussed 
repeatedly in EECSs during 2009 were disclosures for the impairment of non-financial assets and 
business combinations, both of which are closely related to goodwill. Moreover, the Financial 
Reporting Council (2008) assesses goodwill impairment disclosures in 32 of the top 350 UK listed 
companies’ reports for the 2007 fiscal year and characterizes over half of them as rather 
uninformative. Low levels of compliance with disclosure requirements about goodwill are also 
detected in Hungarian companies by Fekete et al. (2008), who find that the average Hungarian 
company disclosed 55% of the applicable disclosure items of IFRS 3 in 2006. Moreover, Paananen 
(2008), using a 13-item index related to the fair value accounting of goodwill, finds that UK-, France 
and Germany-based companies disclosed on average 34%, 29% and 23% of the items, respectively, 
for the year 2005.  
Regarding Greece, Tsalavoutas and Dionysiou (2013) find that in 2005, companies listed on the ASE 
complied with 70% and 49% of applicable disclosure requirements of IFRS 3 and IAS 36, 
respectively, on average. In addition, Ballas and Tzovas (2010) find a similar level of compliance 
with disclosure requirements about goodwill in a small sample of Greek listed companies for 2006. 
The non-compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements may be a negative signal for the market. 
For instance, Sengupta (1998) argues that investors try to assess a firm’s default risk based on all 
available information before lending money to the firm. A factor very likely to be included in their 
risk assessment is the probability that the firm withholds negative information. The larger this 
probability is, the higher the risk premium investors charge the firm and consequently the lower the 
market value of the firm. Thus, it can be argued that in a mandatory disclosures context, even less 
sophisticated investors can easily locate any management attempt for concealing information, as these 
disclosures are specified by accounting standards (Healy & Palepu, 2001). For instance, in the case 
of goodwill impairment testing, if the issuer bases the computation of a cash-generating unit’s 
recoverable amount on the value in use, they should disclose information about the assumptions made 
and the growth rate used for the cash flow projections, explain how the values assigned to each 
assumption have been determined, justify the period used for the cash flow projections and disclose 
the discount rates applied (see Appendix A disclosure items 6-10). To the extent that this information 
justifies whether goodwill should be impaired, it enables investors to better interpret the effects of 
this accounting number on the future performance of the company (Kang & Pang, 2005) or to confirm 
their previous evaluations. 
To date, there is little empirical evidence on whether companies’ compliance behavior with IFRS 
mandatory disclosure requirements affects the value relevance of accounting numbers. The only 
studies examining this issue are those of Paananen (2008) and Tsalavoutas and Dionysiou (2013). 
Both studies attempt to examine whether different levels of disclosure are associated with different 
levels in the value relevance of income and of book value of equity. The findings of both studies 
indicate that there is a significant difference in the value relevance of income but no difference in the 
value relevance of book value of equity.  
                                                 
1 In 2001, the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) was established as an independent committee of 
European Securities regulators. In the beginning of 2011, CESR was replaced by the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA), which is part of the European System of Financial Supervision. 
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Specifically, the study of Paananen (2008), despite examining disclosures related to goodwill, does 
not attempt to associate them with goodwill’s value relevance. Moreover, although the study of 
Tsalavoutas and Dionysiou (2013) examines the disclosures of almost all IFRS, it does not provide 
insights into the relationship between the volume of specific standards’ disclosures and the value 
relevance of specific accounting numbers, e.g., IFRS 3 and IAS 36 disclosures with goodwill. In 
addition, both studies use samples from the first year of the mandatory implementation of IFRS, and 
there is evidence that not all companies were well prepared for the transition (Ballas et al., 2010; 
Jermakowicz & Gornik-Tomaszewski, 2006). Thus, the companies included in their samples might 
be substantially heterogeneous regarding their level of preparation for applying IFRS. 
The present study attempts to enrich our understanding of mandatory disclosures by focusing on 
goodwill disclosures. Specifically, it investigates whether there is a systematic difference in 
goodwill’s valuation effects between companies with relatively high and relatively low levels of 
compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosure requirements for goodwill. Although prior studies 
(Paananen, 2008; Tsalavoutas & Dionysiou, 2013) have shown that the valuation of balance sheet 
items at an aggregated level (that is, the book value of equity) does not differ between companies that 
comply with IFRS disclosure requirements to greater and lesser extents, there are reasons to believe 
that specific balance sheet items that are heavily influenced by FVA might have a different attitude 
due to the particular importance of these items’ disclosures. Among accounting items heavily 
influenced by FVA, explanatory disclosures are of high importance because the accounting treatment 
of these items does not follow detailed rules, being based to a large extent on managerial decisions, 
which have to be justified. An insufficient justification of the assumptions, forecasts and projections 
made by the management shall lead to accounting numbers of low reliability and hence low relevance. 
Otherwise, the extensive disclosure requirements of IFRS seem to have no impact on accounting 
items’ valuation implications, leading to the questioning of their usefulness.  
With regard to the focus of this study, IFRS 3 and IAS 36 mandate voluminous disclosures to provide 
users with sufficient information to assess the objectivity of the management’s assumptions and 
valuations. In such a mandatory disclosures setting, investors have a ‘benchmark’ of extensive 
disclosures that they expect to find in companies’ annual reports. Hence, it is interesting to examine 
whether this ‘benchmark’ affects the relevance of the accounting item under consideration, in this 
case, goodwill. Specifically, the second hypothesis this study examines is 
 
H2: There is a systematic difference in goodwill’s value relevance between companies with relatively 
high and relatively low levels of compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosure requirements for 
goodwill. 
 
4. Research design 
4.1 Empirical models 
This study tests two hypotheses related to the balance sheet item of purchased goodwill: whether 
goodwill recognized in financial statements of companies listed on the ASE is value relevant and 
whether there is a systematic difference in goodwill’s valuation effects between companies with 
relatively high and relatively low levels of compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosure requirements 
for goodwill. Following a well-established branch of value relevance literature (see, for example, 
Aboody & Lev, 1998; Beisland, 2013; Bugeja & Gallery, 2006; Jifri & Citron, 2009; Kang & Pang, 
2005; Ritter & Wells, 2006), an adaptation of Ohlson (1995) model is employed to test the hypotheses 
of this study, which associates a firm’s market value of equity (MV) with its book value of equity 
(BV) and net income before taxes (NIBT): 
 
MVi = α0 + a1BVi + a2NIBTi + εi     
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More specifically, its deflated (by the number of common shares outstanding) version is used: 
 
PRi = α0 + a1BVSi + a2EPSi + εi      
 
where PR is the market value of equity per share four months after company i’s fiscal year-end, BVS 
is the book value of equity per share recognized on company i’s annual balance sheet, EPS is the net 
income before taxes per share recognized on company i’s annual income statement and ε is the error 
term. The use of market values four months after the end of the fiscal year ensures that the accounting 
information is reflected in the market values, as Greek legislation requires that all listed companies 
release their annual reports no later than three months after the end of their fiscal year. 
To mitigate size effects and heteroscedasticity problems, which occur frequently in cross-sectional 
level-based designs, the initial model 1 as well as its expansions, models 2 and 3 (discussed later in 
this text), are estimated on a per share basis, scaled by the number of common shares outstanding 
four months after the company’s fiscal year-end. Barth and Clinch (2009) compare six alternative 
estimation models specifications of Ohlson (1995) model and find that using per share specifications 
better mitigates such problems because it results in more consistent and less biased estimations of the 
coefficients’ p-values and regression explanatory power. In addition, observations with high values 
of Cook’s distance statistic2 are identified as highly influential and are therefore eliminated. Finally, 
White’s t-statistic adjustments are used. 
Moreover, prior studies have evidenced significant differences between the earnings coefficients of 
loss- and profit-making companies (Hayn, 1995; Joos & Plesko, 2005). To control for such 
differences, a binary variable LOSS is used, which equals one if the company is loss-making and zero 
otherwise. Finally, the model is augmented by the dummy variable IND, which controls for industry 
effects. Specifically, IND equals one if the company is manufacturing and zero otherwise. Hence, the 
basic model is the following: 
 
PRi = α0 + a1BVSi + a2EPSi + Controlsi + εi     (1) 
 
Model 1 is the basic aggregated model. Model 2 is obtained by decomposing BVS across the book 
value of equity excluding goodwill per share (BV_GWS) and book value of goodwill per share 
(GWS). Similar to Bugeja and Gallery (2006), Jifri and Citron (2009) and Ritter and Wells (2006), 
model 2 is used for the examination of purchased goodwill’s value relevance: 
 
PRi = α0 + a1BV_GWSi + a2GWSi + a3EPSi + Controlsi + εi   (2) 
 
Value relevance studies examine how well the accounting number(s) of interest are reflected in 
companies’ equity market values (Barth et al., 2001). Because the main scope of the first hypothesis 
is the examination of goodwill’s value relevance, coefficient α2 is of particular interest. If coefficient 
α2 is found to be positive and statistically significant (different from zero), then it can be inferred that 
goodwill “reflects information relevant to investors in valuing the firm and is measured reliably 
enough to be reflected in share prices” (Barth et al., 2001, p. 80). 
Regarding the second hypothesis, to investigate whether there is a systematic difference in purchased 
goodwill’s valuation effects between companies with relatively high and relatively low levels of 
                                                 
2 Observations with Cook’s distance statistic greater than 4/n, where n is the number of observations. 
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compliance with IFRS disclosure requirements for goodwill, the binary variable DLC is incorporated 
in model 2. DLC results from the level of compliance with IFRS disclosure requirements for goodwill 
(hereafter LC), which is discussed in the next section. DLC equals one if the LC is greater than or 
equal to the median of the sample’s LC and zero otherwise. The new model 3 is the following: 
 
PRi = α0 + a1BV_GWSi + a2GWSi + a3EPSi + a4 DLCi + a5GWSi×DLCi + Controlsi + εi (3) 
 
In this case, the interest is focused on the coefficient α5 of the interaction variable. If α5 is statistically 
significant and positive, then it can be inferred that the value relevance of goodwill under IFRS is 
higher in companies with a relatively high level of compliance than in companies with a relatively 
low level of compliance with IFRS disclosure requirements for goodwill. 
 
4.2 Level of compliance ratio  
As discussed in the previous section, testing the second hypothesis requires the computation of 
companies’ levels of compliance with IFRS disclosure requirements for goodwill. Hence, a disclosure 
index is constructed (see Appendix A) in which all of the IFRS 3 disclosure requirements (38 
disclosure items) and the requirements of IAS 36 related to goodwill (20 disclosure items) are 
included3. The index is based on Deloitte’s IFRS - Presentation and Disclosure Checklist (Deloitte, 
2009). Prior studies have followed a similar pattern using indices constructed, for instance, by S&P 
(Othman & Zeghal, 2010), Ernst and Young (Glaum & Street, 2003) or the Egyptian Capital Market 
Authority (Hassan et al., 2006). In addition, to ensure its thoroughness, the index is compared with 
similar checklists for the other three Big-4 accounting firms (Ernst & Young, 2009; KPMG, 2009; 
Pricewaterhouse, 2009). 
The use of an index enables the quantification of the level of compliance through a ratio (LC) that 
takes values from zero (no compliance) to one (full compliance). To calculate the LC, two approaches 
are employed to ensure that the results are not driven by the chosen approach. First, the so-called 
unweighted approach is employed (Cooke, 1989; Glaum & Street, 2003; Hassan et al., 2006; Jahangir 
et al., 2004; Othman & Zeghal, 2010). According to this approach, if a required item is found to be 
disclosed, it is scored as ‘1’. If not, it is scored as ‘0’, and if the item is not applicable, it is 
characterized as ‘NA’. The LC of each company is calculated as the ratio of the total items disclosed 
to the total number of applicable disclosure items. This method treats each disclosure item equally 
and thus assumes that users place the same ‘weight’ on each item or, in other words, that each item 
is of equal importance to the users. Cooke (1989), arguing in favor of the unweighted approach, notes 
that “An approach which tried to encapsulate the subjective weights of a multitude of user groups 
would be unwieldy and probably futile” (Cooke, 1989, p. 182). 
Nevertheless, when multiple accounting standards are examined, the unweighted approach has a 
disadvantage: the more items are mandated by a standard, the greater the impact of this standard on 
the level of compliance (Tsalavoutas et al., 2010). The present study examines companies’ levels of 
compliance using two standards that differ substantially in the number of disclosure items they 
mandate (38 for IFRS 3 and 20 for IAS 36). Thus, to ensure that the results of the study are not 
affected by the measurement method, a second, weighted approach is employed. This method treats 
each standard and not each disclosure item equally (Street & Gray, 2002; Tsalavoutas & Dionysiou, 
2013). A separate compliance ratio per standard is calculated following the unweighted approach 
described previously, and the sum of the compliance ratios per standard is then divided by the number 
of applicable standards examined. Finally, to ensure that the examined companies are not penalized 
                                                 
3 As discussed in the next section, the sample is comprised of companies found to have purchased goodwill recognized 
in their 2008 annual reports. It should be mentioned that in 2008, none of these companies voluntarily adopted the then-
new amendments of the standards mandated by January 1st, 2009. Thus, the same requirements apply to all companies. 
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for noncompliance with disclosures that are not applicable, the complete annual report of every 
company is reviewed. 
 
4.3 Sample selection and data sources 
For the empirical tests, data from the 2008 fiscal year are used. According to the daily official stock-
list of the ASE, 283 companies were actively traded in the market on April 30th, 20094. A detailed 
search of the 2008 annual reports of these companies revealed that 95 have purchased goodwill 
recognized on their financial statements. Of these 95 companies, 10 belong to the banking and 
financial services sectors and are therefore excluded due to the different nature of their assets and 
liabilities and the different regulatory requirements applied to them. These differences may have a 
substantial impact on the relationship between accounting numbers and market values (Ahmed et al., 
2000; Dahmash et al., 2009). In addition, under Greek legislation, a firm’s fiscal year shall end on 
either December 31st or June 30th. Two of the companies have fiscal years ending on June 30th and 
are eliminated to ensure that all companies are at a similar stage in the process of financial statement 
preparation (Bugeja & Gallery, 2006; Jennings, et al., 1996). Two more companies with negative 
book values of equity are excluded to enhance the inferential quality (Ahmed et al., 2000) and reduce 
the noise (Bugeja & Gallery, 2006) of the empirical tests. Finally, five companies are identified by 
Cook’s distance statistic5 as highly influential observations and are thus eliminated. The final number 
of companies included in the initial analysis is 76 (Table 2). Appendix B lists the 76 companies and 
their respective industry classifications. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Regarding the sources of the data utilized in this study, the accounting data (book value of equity, 
goodwill and net income before taxes) result from hand-collection during the review of companies’ 
2008 annual reports. For the industry binary variable, the ASE classification is adopted. Finally, the 
market value of the equity and the number of common shares outstanding four months after the end 
of the companies’ fiscal year (that is, April 30th, 2009) are retrieved from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream database. 
 
5. Findings  
5.1 The level of compliance descriptives 
Table 3 provides basic summary statistics for the level of compliance per standard (IFRS 3 and IAS 
36) and per measurement approach (LC_u for unweighted and LC_w for weighted). One company 
was found to not be required to comply with any of the IAS 36 disclosure requirements; therefore, 
descriptive statistics for the level of compliance with IAS 36 are provided for the remaining 75 
observations. A first striking finding is that although companies comply highly with IFRS 3, they 
present the opposite behavior towards IAS 36 requirements. Specifically, the mean level of 
compliance with IFRS 3 requirements is 0.82, and the median is 1.00, showing that over half of the 
companies (41 companies) fully comply with IFRS 3. On the other hand, the mean level of 
compliance with IAS 36 requirements is only 0.29, with standard deviation 0.35 and median 0.14. In 
fact, 30 companies were found to exhibit no compliance with IAS 36 disclosure requirements.  
                                                 
4 Greek accounting regulation dictates that companies’ fiscal years shall end on either December 31st or June 30th, whereas 
in practice, almost all companies listed on the ASE have fiscal year-ends on December 31st. Because the dependent 
variable of the empirical models employed is the market value of equity four months after the company’s fiscal year-end, 
the sample companies must be active on April 30th to be included. 
5 Observations with Cook’s distance greater than 4/n, where n is the number of observations, are excluded. 
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[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Regarding the total level of compliance, the average company complies with approximately half of 
the disclosure requirements. Specifically, under the unweighted approach, the mean of LC_u is 0.49, 
whereas under the weighted approach, the mean of LC_w is 0.56. Similarly, the medians of LC_u 
and LC_w are 0.44 and 0.51, respectively. It should be stressed that the difference is statistically 
significant (Wilcoxon signed-rank test6 z = -3.508, p = 0.001). This significant difference further 
validates potential concerns about employing a single method for measuring the level of compliance. 
This finding is indicative that 18 companies (24% of the sample) are classified in different compliance 
groups (high/low) under the two different measurement approaches. Hence, the employment of such 
significantly different measuring approaches ensures that the findings are not driven by the 
measurement method. 
 
5.2 Data description and univariate analysis 
Table 4 presents companies’ distribution per level of compliance and industry. Of the 18 ASE 
industries, 14 are presented in the sample. It is worth mentioning that companies from three additional 
sectors are found to have purchased goodwill recognized on their financial statements, but they are 
eliminated for reasons discussed in section 4.3. Although almost every ASE industry is represented 
in the sample, the distribution of companies per industry is largely uneven. More than half of the 
companies (56%) belong to four industries (construction and materials, industrial goods and services, 
food and beverage, technology). An interesting, albeit expected, finding is that three of these 
industries can be characterized as intangible-intensive industries. Specifically, Collins et al. (1997) 
identify seven intangible-intensive industries (plastic and synthetic materials; drugs; computer and 
office equipment; electronic components and accessories; communications; business services; 
engineering, accounting, R&D and management related services), which coincide with three of the 
ASE sectors mentioned above. Overall, 42 companies (55%) can be identified as belonging to an 
intangible-intensive industry. With respect to the partitioning of companies into high- and low-LC 
groups, the food and beverage industry presents a large discrepancy between the number of 
companies with high and low levels of compliance, with the latter far exceeding the former. The 
industrial goods and services industry presents the opposite trend, as most companies comply highly 
with the examined disclosure requirements. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Table 5, Panel A provides basic summary statistics for the variables utilized in the multivariate 
analysis for the full sample as well as per compliance group under both measurement approaches. All 
accounting/financial variables are presented on a per share basis. A non-parametric Mann-Whitney 
test7 reveals that under the unweighted approach, the average company that belongs to the high-
compliance group has a significantly larger market value per share, book value per share and goodwill 
per share than the average company in the low-compliance group. However, this is not the case under 
the weighted approach, where the test reveals no significant difference in any of the variables. 
Regarding the binary variables, it is worth mentioning that 39% of the companies are in the 
manufacturing industry and that a quarter of the examined companies reported losses in 2008. 
                                                 
6 A non-parametric test is chosen due to data deviation from normality 




[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
To obtain a more informed understanding of the sample, Table 5, Panel B provides supplementary 
descriptives of the sample companies’ purchased goodwill as a proportion of their total assets and net 
assets. These data are not utilized in further statistical analysis but are useful for drawing inferences 
regarding companies’ characteristics in relation to their level of compliance. Specifically, the aim of 
this analysis is to provide some evidence on whether companies that differ in terms of their level of 
compliance with goodwill disclosure requirements also differ in terms of the magnitude of purchased 
goodwill they accumulate on their balance sheets. A large amount of accumulated goodwill might 
present an additional value at risk in the case of impairment recognition (Haslam et al., 2013). Thus, 
it is reasonable to assume that the level of compliance would be higher in companies where goodwill 
constitutes a large part of their assets than in those with a smaller goodwill-to-assets ratio. 
On average, goodwill constitutes a considerable part of companies’ balance sheets. Specifically, 6% 
of companies’ total assets and 23% of their net assets is purchased goodwill. In addition, it is worth 
mentioning that purchased goodwill represents a considerable amount of companies’ balance sheets 
regardless of their classification as low- or high-compliance companies. Under the unweighted 
approach, the average low-compliance company has a goodwill-to-total-assets ratio of 5% and a 
goodwill-to-net-assets ratio of 18%, whereas the respective ratios for the average high-compliance 
company are 8% and 29%, respectively. Under the weighted approach, the ratios are the same except 
for that of goodwill to net assets for low-compliance companies, which is 17%. A Mann-Whitney test 
reveals that, under the unweighted approach, low- and high-compliance companies differ 
significantly in regard to the goodwill to total assets ratio. However, no significant difference is found 
for the same ratio under the weighted approach. Furthermore, regardless the measurement approach, 
the goodwill-to-net-assets ratio between the two groups does not present any significant difference. 
Based on the above findings, it can be inferred that companies that differ in terms of their level of 
compliance with goodwill do not differ in terms of the magnitude of purchased goodwill they 
accumulate on their balance sheets, at least when the level of compliance is measured under the 
weighted approach. 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Finally, Table 6 reports the Spearman and Pearson correlation coefficients for all of the variables 
utilized in the analysis. The correlations among variables are within the conventional levels (less than 
0.80), indicating the absence of multicollinearity problems (Gujarati, 1995). In one case, the 
correlation coefficients are found to be higher than the threshold of 0.80 (BVS and BV_GWS), but 
this has no impact on the analysis because these two variables are not used in the same regressions. 
Moreover, the GWS variable is positively correlated with the dependent variable, which can be 
interpreted as a preliminary indication on a univariate basis that purchased goodwill is value relevant. 
 
5.3 Multivariate analysis 
Table 7 shows the estimated coefficients of the multiple ordinary least squares (hereafter OLS) 
regressions for the three models. Model 1 is the basic aggregated model, which tests the value 
relevance of book value of equity per share (BVS) and net income before taxes per share (EPS). The 
main model for testing the first hypothesis is model 2, in which BVS is decomposed across book 
value of equity excluding goodwill per share (BV_GWS) and goodwill per share (GWS). The results 
for model 1 show that the book value of equity (BVS) and net income before taxes (EPS) are highly 
associated with companies’ market value (PR). In particular, the model 1 regression coefficients are 
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0.596 for BVS and 2.957 for EPS (both statistically significant at the 1% level). Regarding model 2, 
the book value of equity excluding goodwill (BV_GWS) remains highly statistically significant after 
excluding goodwill despite goodwill being found to constitute a large part of net assets. Specifically, 
the model 2 coefficients are 0.454 for BV_GWS and 2.830 for EPS (both statistically significant at 
the 1% level). With reference to purchased goodwill, the estimated coefficient of GWS is positive 
(1.084) and highly statistically significant (at the 1% level). Hence, it can be inferred with sufficient 
certainty that the first hypothesis is confirmed and that the fair value measurement of goodwill under 
IFRS generally leads to relevant information. 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
Regarding the second hypothesis, model 3 tests whether there is a systematic difference in goodwill’s 
valuation effects between companies with relatively high and relatively low levels of compliance 
(LC). Here, the focal point of interest is the coefficient of the interaction variable GWS*DLC, where 
DLC equals one if LC is equal to or greater than the sample’s median LC and zero otherwise. To 
calculate the LC, two approaches (unweighted and weighted) are employed to minimize the 
probability that the results are driven by the compliance measurement method. Thus, model 3 is 
estimated twice, and the final four columns of Table 7 provide the coefficients and respective standard 
errors of the estimations under both LC measurement approaches. The findings are similar under both 
approaches and confirm the second hypothesis. Specifically, under the unweighted (weighted) 
approach, the BV_GWS coefficient is 0.451 (0.477), and the EPS coefficient is 2.664 (2.550), with 
all coefficients being significant at the 1% level. Moreover, under both approaches, the GWS 
coefficient is found to be positive but not statistically significant, whereas the coefficient of the 
interaction variable GWS*DLC is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level (1.075 and 
1.133 under the unweighted and weighted approaches, respectively). These findings indicate that 
there is a systematic difference in goodwill’s value relevance between companies with high and low 
levels of compliance with disclosure requirements. In particular, it can be inferred that goodwill has 
a strong effect on the equities’ market valuation of companies with high compliance but no effect on 
that of companies with low compliance. 
 
5.4 Robustness test 
As discussed earlier, it is reasonable to assume that companies’ level of compliance with IFRS 
disclosure requirements for goodwill may be driven by the magnitude of purchased goodwill 
accumulated on their balance sheets. In section 5.2, some evidence is provided that companies that 
differ in terms of level of compliance do not differ in terms of the magnitude of purchased goodwill 
accumulated on their balance sheets. In this section, further evidence concerning this issue is 
provided. Specifically, the three models are re-estimated utilizing a sub-sample in which companies 
below the 25th percentile in terms of goodwill-to-total-assets ratio in the sample are excluded. 
Companies with a very small (relative to their size) amount of accumulated goodwill recognized on 
their balance sheets may decide not to provide detailed disclosures about goodwill because there is 
no additional value at risk in the case of goodwill impairment losses. In contrast, the remaining 
companies in the examined sub-sample carry a relatively large amount of goodwill8; consequently, it 
can be assumed that they share similar impairment risks.  
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
                                                 
8 The remaining companies in the sub-sample under examination have a goodwill-to-total-assets ratio of at least 1%. 
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The examined sub-sample consists of 56 observations. Out of the initial 81 companies, 20 belong to 
the bottom 25% and are eliminated. In addition, five more observations are excluded because they 
are identified by Cook’s distance statistic as highly influential. Table 8 presents the results of the 
three models. The estimated coefficients of the sub-sample are statistically and economically similar 
to those of the initial multivariate analysis of the 76 companies (Table 7). Hence, it can be inferred 
with even greater certainty that purchased goodwill is value relevant only in companies that comply 
highly with IFRS disclosure requirements, regardless of the magnitude of goodwill. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
The purpose of this study is to enrich the ongoing debate upon the accounting treatment of purchased 
goodwill under IFRS. It attempts to draw attention to the market valuation implications of goodwill 
under IFRS in a country outside the Anglo-Saxon accounting paradigm, where goodwill’s value 
relevance has not been thoroughly examined. In countries that differ substantially from the 
institutional environment and accounting tradition of the so-called Anglo-Saxon countries, the 
extensive use of FVA may lead to measurement failures (intentional or unintentional on the part of 
the management), especially for accounting numbers that result from ‘mark to model’ estimates (Ball, 
2006). This study provides empirical evidence that, despite its severe criticism, the use of ‘mark to 
model’ estimations results in relevant accounting numbers, even in an environment regarded as 
unfavorable for the implementation of IFRS in general and FVA in particular. Specifically, the 
findings reveal that purchased goodwill conveys relevant information for ASE participants. The 
goodwill coefficient is positive and statistically significant; thus, it can be inferred that goodwill 
“reflects information relevant to investors in valuing the firm and is measured reliably enough to be 
reflected in share prices” (Barth et al., 2001, p. 80). 
A possible explanation for this result is given by Scott (2012). Over the last several years, the 
efficiency of capital markets and consequently investors’ collective rationality have been questioned. 
To the extent that a capital market is not fully efficient, the application of FVA may enhance the 
decision usefulness of financial reporting because it may help investors assess more accurately future 
cash flows than historical cost financial statements do (Scott, 2012). On this basis, it could be 
speculated that because the efficiency of ASE is questionable (Dicle & Levendis, 2011), the high 
value relevance of goodwill could be attributed to the extent of ASE efficiency. This is an open 
empirical question for future research. 
Although purchased goodwill is found to be value relevant, a potential negative consequence of its 
accounting treatment under IFRS is the accumulation of large amounts of goodwill on companies’ 
balance sheets, especially in times of rising prices and stable markets. This accumulated goodwill 
may represent a substantial risk in ‘bad times’ if companies have to write it off and recognize 
impairment losses. Nevertheless, the findings of this study show that accumulated goodwill has a 
positive impact on a company’s market valuation only if the company exhibits a high level of 
compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements for goodwill. Thus, a high level of compliance 
is an important factor that enables investors to interpret the effects of accounting numbers on the 
future performance of the company (Kang & Pang, 2005). In contrast, if a company exhibits a low 
level of compliance, goodwill is not found to be value relevant, which indicates that investors do not 
expect (and hence do not discount) any future economic benefit from goodwill; in other words, they 
‘write off’ goodwill before companies do. These results are indicative of the importance of IFRS 
mandatory disclosures, especially for accounting items that are heavily influenced by FVA. Although 
prior studies conclude that the value relevance of net assets at an aggregated level (that is, the book 
value of equity) does not differ between companies with high and low levels of compliance with IFRS 
disclosure requirements (Paananen, 2008; Tsalavoutas & Dionysiou, 2013), this study shows that for 
specific assets that are heavily influenced by FVA (such as purchased goodwill), their value relevance 
might differ by the level of compliance with disclosure requirements. 
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In summary, the purpose of this study is to provide evidence that FVA generates relevant accounting 
numbers but only under specific conditions. At an aggregated level, the purchased goodwill of 
companies listed in the ASE is value relevant. Hence, it can be inferred that FVA produces relevant 
accounting information even in environments that are unfavorable for the application of IFRS. 
Nevertheless, a highly transparent annual report seems to be a crucial prerequisite of the relevance of 
the accounting numbers, at least in the case of mandatory disclosures for purchased goodwill, as 
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Table 1: Valuation methods employed in business combination accounted by the acquisition 
method under IFRS and Greek accounting regulation 
 IFRS Greek Accounting Regulation 
Tangible Assets Fair Values Current Values 
Intangible Assets Historical Cost / Fair Values Historical Cost 
Financial Instruments  
traded in an active market 
Fair Values 
Lower value between acquisition cost  
and average market value of the last 
month 
Financial Instruments  
not traded in an active market 
Valuation based on similar  
instruments that can be measured 
reliable 
Lower value between  
acquisition cost and carrying value 
Inventories 
Selling price  
(-) disposal cost (-) profit margin 
Lower value between  
acquisition cost and current value 
Liabilities (except taxes and 
employee benefits) 
Present values  











Table 2. Companies selection process 
Companies Selection  Companies 
Companies with purchased goodwill 95  
less companies belonging to the banking and financial services sectors -10  
less companies with fiscal year-end on June 30th -2  
less companies with negative book value of equity -2  
less highly influential observations identified by Cook’s distance statistic -5  











Table 3. Summary statistics of companies’ level of compliance  
per standard and measurement approach 
  Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max N 
IFRS 3 0.82 1.00 0.23 0.17 1.00 76 
IAS 36a 0.29 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 75 
LC_u 0.49 0.44b 0.25 0.12 1.00 76 
LC_w 0.56 0.51b 0.23 0.09 1.00 76 
LC_u is the level of compliance measured by the unweighted approach and LC_w is the level of compliance measured 
by the weighted approach. 
a In one case IAS 36 found to be not applicable 
b A non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test revealed a statistically significant difference between LC_u and LC_w             






Table 4. Companies’ distribution per compliance group and industry 
Industry 
Unweighted Approach   Weighted  Approach   
Total f (%) 
Low LC High LC   Low LC High LC   
Basic Resources 1 2   2 1   3 4% 
Chemicals 3 1   3 1   4 5% 
Construction and Materials 6 4   6 4   10 13% 
Food & Beverage 9 3   8 4   12 16% 
Health Care 3 4   2 5   7 9% 
Industrial Goods & Services 4 7   3 8   11 14% 
Media 3 2   2 3   5 7% 
Oil & Gas 1 1   1 1   2 3% 
Personal & Household Goods 4 3   4 3   7 9% 
Real Estate 0 1   0 1   1 1% 
Retail 0 2   1 1   2 3% 
Technology 3 7   5 5   10 13% 
Travel and Leisure 1 0   1 0   1 1% 
Utilities 0 1   0 1   1 1% 
Total 38 38   38 38   76 100% 
Under the ‘Low LC’ (‘High LC’) headings, companies with level of compliance (LC) lower (equal to or higher) than 






Table 5. Descriptive statistics 
    
Full Sample (N=76) 
  Unweighted Approach   Weighted Approach 
      Low (N=38)   High (N=38)   Low (N=38)   High (N=38) 




S.D.   Mean Median S.D.   Mean Median S.D.   Mean Median S.D.   Mean Median S.D. 
                                          
Panel A Basic descriptives of the regressions variables                             
PR   2,79 1,39 3,34   1,78 0,96 2,04   3,80 1,99 4,05   2,19 1,36 2,18   3,38 1,43 4,14 
BVS   2,69 2,12 2,76   1,83 1,50 1,38   3,55 2,68 3,47   2,38 2,22 2,01   2,99 1,87 3,35 
BV_GWS   2,10 1,42 2,29   1,56 1,28 1,32   2,64 1,66 2,87   2,04 1,53 1,90   2,17 1,25 2,64 
GWS   0,58 0,21 0,99   0,26 0,12 0,40   0,90 0,42 1,27   0,34 0,19 0,45   0,83 0,26 1,29 
EPS   0,26 0,12 0,58   0,15 0,10 0,42   0,37 0,23 0,70   0,24 0,12 0,43   0,28 0,11 0,71 
Binary variables                    
IND   0,39 0,00 0,49   0,39 0,00 0,50   0,39 0,00 0,50   0,39 0,00 0,50   0,39 0,00 0,50 
LOSS   0,25 0,00 0,44   0,29 0,00 0,46   0,21 0,00 0,41   0,18 0,00 0,39   0,32 0,00 0,47 
DLC_u   0,50 0,50 0,50                                 
DLC_w   0,50 0,50 0,50                                 
                                          
Panel B Supplementary descriptives of the sample                          
GW/TA   0,06 0,03 0,07   0,05 0,03 0,06   0,08 0,05 0,08   0,05 0,03 0,06   0,08 0,04 0,08 
GW/BV   0,23 0,13 0,28   0,18 0,11 0,23   0,29 0,17 0,31   0,17 0,12 0,19   0,29 0,15 0,33 
PR is market value of equity per share four months after fiscal year-end (30th April 2009), BVS is book value of equity per share, BV_GWS is book value of equity per share excluding 
goodwill per share, GWS is book value of goodwill per share, EPS is net income before taxes (earnings) per share, IND is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is manufacturing 
and zero otherwise, LOSS is a dummy variable that equals one if the company is loss making and zero otherwise, DLC_u (DLC_w) is a dummy variable that equals one if company’s 
LC_u (LC_w) is higher or equal than sample’s median LC_u (LC_w) and zero otherwise.  
GW/TA is the ratio of purchased goodwill to total assets and GW/BV is the ratio of purchased goodwill to book value of equity  
A non-parametric Mann-Whitney test is performed for comparing the descriptives between low and high compliant companies under both compliance measurement approach.  





Table 6 Correlation matrix of variables 
  PR BVS BV_GWS GWS EPS IND LOSS D1 D2 
PR   0,80 0,70 0,61 0,77 0,19 -0,30 0,30 0,18 
BVS 0,75   0,94 0,62 0,65 0,26 -0,23 0,31 0,11 
BV_GWS 0,68 0,89   0,31 0,61 0,32 -0,27 0,24 0,03 
GWS 0,29 0,49 0,17   0,39 -0,03 -0,02 0,33 0,25 
EPS 0,70 0,53 0,57 0,25   0,19 -0,56 0,20 0,03 
IND 0,10 0,21 0,31 -0,07 0,18   -0,09 0,00 0,00 
LOSS -0,43 -0,29 -0,39 -0,09 -0,75 -0,09   -0,09 0,15 
D1 0,32 0,30 0,17 0,32 0,18 0,00 -0,09   0,53 
D2 0,07 0,04 -0,05 0,13 -0,02 0,00 0,15 0,53   
Spearman's rank correlation coefficients and Pearson's correlation coefficients are provided above and below the 
diagonal respectively  
Figures in bold indicate statistical significance at least at 5% level  




Table 7. Regressions results 
Model 1:  PRi = α0 + a1BVSi + a2EPSi + a3INDi + a4LOSSi + εi 
Model 2:  PRi = α0 + a1BV_GWSi + a2GWSi + a3EPSi + a4INDi + a5LOSS + εi 
Model 3:  PRi = α0 + a1BV_GWSi + a2GWSi + a3EPSi + a4DLCi + a5GWSi×DLCi + a6INDi + a7LOSS + εi 
  
Model 1 Model 2 
Model 3 
  Unweighted Approach Weighted  Approach 
Variables Coef SE Coef SE Coef. SE Coef. SE 
Constant 0.313 0.23 0.323 0.22 0.595 0.39 0.574 0.37 
BVS 0.596 0.10***             
EPS 2.957 0.70***             
BV_GWS     0.454 0.12*** 0.451 0.12*** 0.477 0.11*** 
GWS     1.084 0.30*** 0.103 0.33 0.056 0.31 
EPS     2.830 0.73*** 2.664 0.78*** 2.550 0.79*** 
DLC         -0.090 0.48 0.053 0.89 
GWS×DLC         1.075 0.51** 1.133 0.47** 
                  
Controls                 
IND -0.198 0.45 0.053 0.45 -0.033 0.46 -0.022 0.45 
LOSS 0.735 0.46 0.485 0.49 0.259 0.54 -0.111 0.53 
                  
N 76 76 76 76 
F-stat 37.48*** 57.97*** 50.16*** 50.88*** 
Adj. R2 0.757 0.777 0.785 0.790 
Under the unweighted approach the level of compliance LC_u and under the weighted approach the LC_w are used 
respectively for dividing the companies into “high complied” and “low complied” groups. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
Standard errors are based on White’s adjustments 
Variables definitions are provided on Table 5 
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Table 8. Regressions results – robustness test 
Model 1:  PRi = α0 + a1BVSi + a2EPSi + a3INDi + a4LOSSi + εi 
Model 2:  PRi = α0 + a1BV_GWSi + a2GWSi + a3EPSi + a4INDi + a5LOSS + εi 
Model 3:  PRi = α0 + a1BV_GWSi + a2GWSi + a3EPSi + a4DLCi + a5GWSi×DLCi + a6INDi + a7LOSS + εi 
  
Model 1 Model 2 
Model 3 
  Unweighted Approach Weighted  Approach 
Variables Coef SE Coef SE Coef. SE Coef. SE 
Constant 0.089 0.27 0.042 0.28 0.761 0.58 0.799 0.67 
BVS 0.643 0.13***             
EPS 2.816 0.84***             
BV_GWS     0.399 0.17** 0.415 0.16** 0.380 0.18** 
GWS     1.408 0.35*** 0.097 0.48 0.023 0.60 
EPS     2.591 0.83*** 2.289 0.88** 2.430 0.87*** 
DLC         -0.672 0.58 -0.822 0.79 
GWS×DLC         1.510 0.61** 1.548 0.76** 
                  
Controls                 
IND -0.192 0.57 0.267 0.56 0.027 0.55 0.281 0.61 
LOSS 0.891 0.53 0.539 0.55 0.151 0.61 0.418 0.55 
                  
N 56 56 56 56 
F-stat 35.00*** 76.69*** 74.67*** 69.98*** 
Adj. R2 0.771 0.811 0.822 0.821 
Under the unweighted approach the level of compliance LC_1 and under the weighted approach the LC_2 are used 
respectively for dividing the companies into “high complied” and “low complied” groups. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
Standard errors are based on White’s adjustments 






















APPENDIX A: Disclosures Checklist (the items under examination are shaded) 
 
IFRS 3, version including amendments issued up to 17 January 2008 
 
IFRS 3 Par. 62 Where the acquirer has made adjustments to provisional values determined at the time of the initial 
accounting for a business combination, in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 62 of IFRS 
3, comparative information presented for the periods before the initial accounting for the combination 
is complete (i.e. for periods before the adjustments are made) shall be presented as if the initial 
accounting had been completed from the acquisition date. 
IFRS 3 Par. 67 For each material business combination that was effected during the period, the acquirer shall 
disclose: 
IFRS 3.67(a) a) the names and descriptions of the combining entities or businesses; 
IFRS 3.67(b) b) the acquisition date;  
IFRS 3.67(c) c) the percentage of voting equity instruments acquired; 
IFRS 3.67(d) d) the cost of the combination, and a description of the components of that cost, including any costs 
directly attributable to the combination; 
IFRS 3.67(d) e) where equity instruments are issued or issuable as part of the cost of the combination, the following 
information: 
  i)        the number of equity instruments issued or issuable; 
  ii)       the fair value of the equity instruments issued or issuable; and 
  iii)      the basis for determining that fair value; 
IFRS 3.67(d) f) in disclosing the basis for determining the fair value of equity instruments issued or issuable as part 
of the cost of the combination, if a published price for the instruments did not exist at the date of 
exchange, the significant assumptions used to determine fair value; 
IFRS 3.67(d) g) in disclosing the basis for determining the fair value of equity instruments issued or issuable as 
part of the cost of the combination, if a published price for the instruments existed at the date of 
exchange, but was not used as the basis for determining the cost of the combination:  
  i)        that fact; 
  ii)       the reasons the published price was not used;  
  iii)      the method and significant assumptions used to attribute a value to the equity instruments; and  
  iv)      the aggregate amount of the difference between the value attributed to, and the published price 
of, the equity instruments; 
IFRS 3.67(e) h) details of any operations the entity has decided to dispose of as a result of the business combination; 
IFRS 3.67(f) i) the amounts recognized at the acquisition date for each class of the acquiree’s assets, liabilities and 
contingent liabilities;  
IFRS 3.67(f) j) unless disclosure would be impracticable, the carrying amounts of each class of the acquiree’s 
assets, liabilities and contingent liabilities, determined in accordance with IFRSs, immediately before 
the combination; 
IFRS 3.67(f) k) if disclosure of such IFRS carrying amounts immediately before combination is impracticable, that 
fact, together with an explanation of why this is the case; 
IFRS 3.67(h) l) a description of the factors that contributed to a cost that results in the recognition of goodwill: 
  i)        a description of each intangible asset that was not recognized separately from goodwill; and 
  ii)       an explanation of why the intangible asset’s fair value could not be measured reliably; 
IFRS 3.67(g) m) in respect of any excess of the acquirer’s interest in the net fair value of the acquiree’s 
identifiable assets, liabilities and contingent liabilities over cost: 
  i)        the amount of any such excess recognized in profit or loss in accordance with paragraph 56 
of IFRS 3; and 
  ii)       the line item in the statement of comprehensive income in which the excess is recognized; 
IFRS 3.67(h) n) a description of the nature of any excess of the acquirer’s interest in the net fair value of the 
acquiree’s identifiable assets, liabilities and contingent liabilities over cost, recognized in profit or 
loss in accordance with paragraph 56 of IFRS 3; 
IFRS 3.67(i) o) unless impracticable, the amount of the acquiree’s profit or loss since the acquisition date 






IAS 36, version including amendments issued up to 17 January 2008 
IFRS 3.67(i) p) if it is impracticable to disclose the amount of the acquiree’s profit or loss since the acquisition 
date included in the acquirer’s profit or loss for the period that fact; and an explanation of why this 
is the case. 
IFRS 3 Par. 69 If the initial accounting for a business combination that was effected during the period has been 
determined only provisionally as described in paragraph 62 of IFRS 3, the entity shall disclose that 
fact and an explanation of why this is the case 
IFRS 3 Par. 70 Unless impracticable, the following information shall be disclosed: 
IFRS 3.70(a) a) the revenue of the combined entity for the period as though the acquisition date for all business 
combinations effected during the period had been the beginning of the period; and 
IFRS 3.70(b) b) the profit or loss of the combined entity for the period as though the acquisition date for all 
business combinations effected during the period had been the beginning of the period. 
IFRS 3.70 If disclosure of the information required by paragraphs 70(a) and 70(b) of IFRS 3 (see above) 
would be impracticable, the entity shall disclose that fact and an explanation of why this is the case 
IFRS 3 Par. 72 The acquirer shall disclose information that enables users of its financial statements to evaluate the 
financial effects of gains, losses, error corrections and other adjustments recognized in the current 
period that relate to business combinations that were effected in the current or in previous periods. 
IFRS 3 Par. 73 The entity shall disclose: 
IFRS 3.73(a) a) the amount, and an explanation, of any gain or loss recognized in the current reporting period that 
relates to the identifiable assets acquired or liabilities or contingent liabilities assumed in a business 
combination that was effected in either the current or a previous period and is of such a size, nature 
or incidence that disclosure is relevant to an understanding of the combined entity’s financial 
performance; 
IFRS 3.73(b) b) if the initial accounting for a business combination that was effected in the immediately preceding 
period was determined only provisionally at the end of that period, the amounts, and explanations, of 
adjustments to the provisional values recognized during the current period; and 
IFRS 3 Par. 75 The entity shall disclose a reconciliation of the carrying amount of goodwill at the beginning and end 
of the period, showing separately: 
IFRS 3.75(a) a) the gross amount and accumulated impairment losses at the beginning of the period; 
IFRS 3.75(b) b) additional goodwill recognized during the period, except where that goodwill is included in a 
disposal group that, on acquisition, meets the criteria to be classified as held for sale in accordance 
with IFRS 5 Non-current Assets Held for Sale and Discontinued Operations; 
IFRS 3.75(c) c) adjustments resulting from the subsequent recognition of deferred tax assets during the period in 
accordance with paragraph 65 of IFRS 3; 
IFRS 3.75(d) d) goodwill included in a disposal group classified as held for sale in accordance with IFRS 5 and 
goodwill derecognized during the period without having previously been included in a disposal group 
classified as held for sale; 
IFRS 3.75(e) e) impairment losses recognized during the period in accordance with IAS 36 Impairment of Assets; 
IFRS 3.75(f) f) net exchange differences arising during the period in accordance with IAS 21 The Effects of 
Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates; 
IFRS 3.75(g) g) any other changes in the carrying amount during the period; and 
IFRS 3.75(h) h) the gross amount and accumulated impairment losses at the end of the period. 
IAS 36 Par. 126 An entity shall disclose, for each class of assets: 
IAS 36.126(a) the line item(s) of the statement of comprehensive income in which the impairment losses are 
included 
IAS 36 Par. 129 An entity that reports segment information in accordance with IAS 14 Segment Reporting shall 
disclose the following for each reportable segment based on its primary format (as defined in IAS 
14): 





IAS 36 Par. 133 If, in accordance with paragraph 84 of IAS 36, any portion of the goodwill acquired in a business 
combination during the period has not been allocated to a cash-generating unit (group of units) at 
the end of the reporting period, the amount of the unallocated goodwill shall be disclosed, together 
with the reasons why that amount remains unallocated. 
IAS 36 Par. 134 An entity shall disclose the information required by (a)-(f) below for each cash-generating unit 
(group of units) for which the carrying amount of goodwill or intangible assets with indefinite useful 
lives allocated to that unit (group of units) is significant in comparison with the entity’s total 
carrying amount of goodwill or intangible assets with indefinite useful lives: 
IAS 36.134(a) a) the carrying amount of goodwill allocated to the unit (group of units); 
IAS 36.134(c) b) the basis on which the unit’s (group of units’) recoverable amount has been determined (i.e. value 
in use or fair value less costs to sell); 
IAS 36.134(d) c) if the unit’s (group of units’) recoverable amount is based on value in use: 
  i)        a description of each key assumption on which management has based its cash flow 
projections for the period covered by the most recent budgets/forecasts; 
  ii) a description of management’s approach to determining the value(s) assigned to each key 
assumption, whether those value(s) reflect past experience or, if appropriate, are consistent with 
external sources of information, and, if not, how and why they differ from past experience or 
external sources of information; 
  iii) the period over which management has projected cash flows based on financial 
budgets/forecasts approved by management and, when a period greater than five years is used for a 
cash-generating unit (group of units), an explanation of why that longer period is justified; 
  iv) the growth rate used to extrapolate cash flow projections beyond the period covered by the most 
recent budgets/forecasts, and the justification for using any growth rate that exceeds the long-term 
average growth rate for the products, industries, or country or countries in which the entity operates, 
or for the market to which the unit (group of units) is dedicated; and 
  v) the discount rate(s) applied to the cash flow projections; 
IAS 36.134(e) d)      if the unit’s (group of units’) recoverable amount is based on fair value less costs to sell, the 
methodology used to determine fair value less costs to sell; 
IAS 36.134(e) e)       if fair value less costs to sell is not determined using an observable market price for the unit 
(group of units), the following information shall also be disclosed: 
  i)        a description of each key assumption on which management has based its determination of 
fair value less costs to sell; and 
  ii) a description of management’s approach to determining the value (or values) assigned to each 
key assumption, whether those values reflect past experience or, if appropriate, are consistent with 
external sources of information, and, if not, how and why they differ from past experience or 
external sources of information; and 
IAS 36.134(e) f) If fair value less costs to sell is determined using discounted cash flow projections, the following 
information shall also be disclosed: 
  i)      the period over which management has projected cash flows. 
  ii)      the growth rate used to extrapolate cash flow projections. 
  iii)       the discount rate(s) applied to the cash flow projections. 
IAS 36.134(f) g) if a reasonably possible change in a key assumption on which management has based its 
determination of the unit’s (group of units’) recoverable amount would cause the unit’s (group of 
units’) carrying amount to exceed its recoverable amount: 
  i) the amount by which the unit’s (group of units’) recoverable amount exceeds its carrying amount; 
  ii) the value assigned to the key assumption; and 
  iii)        the amount by which the value assigned to the key assumption must change, after 
incorporating any consequential effects of that change on the other variables used to measure 
recoverable amount, in order for the unit’s (group of units’) recoverable amount to be equal to its 
carrying amount. 
IAS 36 Par. 135 If some or all of the carrying amount of goodwill or intangible assets with indefinite useful lives is 
allocated across multiple cash-generating units (groups of units), and the amount so allocated to 
each unit (group of units) is not significant in comparison with the entity’s total carrying amount of 
goodwill or intangible assets with indefinite useful lives, that fact shall be disclosed, together with 
the aggregate carrying amount of goodwill or intangible assets with indefinite useful lives allocated 
to those units (groups of units). 
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APPENDIX B: Sample companies in alphabetic order 
 
 
NAME ASE Industry Classification    NAME ASE Industry Classification  
ALAPIS S.A. Health Care   INTERFISH ACQUACUL Food & Beverage 
ATHENS MEDICAL CEN. Health Care   INTRACOM HOLDINGS Technology 
ATHENS WATERSUPPLY Utilities   INTRALOT S.A. Travel and Leisure 
ATTICA PUBLISHING Media   J & P AVAX SA Construction and Materials 
AUDIO VISUAL Media   KLOUKINAS LAPPAS SA Construction and Materials 
AXON HOLDINGS SA Health Care   KORRES NATURAL Personal / Household Goods 
BIOMEDICAL & ROBOT Health Care   KREKA SA Food & Beverage 
C. CARDASSILARIS SA Food & Beverage   KRETA FARM SA Food & Beverage 
CENTRIC MULTIMEDIA Personal / Household Goods   LAVIPHARM SA Health Care 
COCA-COLA HBC Food & Beverage   M. J. MAILLIS S.A. Industrial Goods & Services 
CROWN HELLAS CAN Industrial Goods & Services   MARAC ELECTRONICS SA  Technology 
CYCLON HELLAS SA Chemicals   MATHIOS SA  Construction and Materials 
DIAG & THER CTR Health Care   METKA SA Industrial Goods & Services 
DIAS AQUACULTURE SA Food & Beverage   MOTOR OIL SA Oil & Gas 
DIONIC SA Industrial Goods & Services   MYTILINEOS HOLDING Basic Resources 
EDRASIS C. PSALLIDAS Construction and Materials   NIREFS AQUACULTURE Food & Beverage 
EKTER SA Construction and Materials   NUTRIART S.A. Food & Beverage 
ELBISCO HOLDING Food & Beverage   PAPERPACK-TSOUKARID Industrial Goods & Services 
ELGEKA SA Food & Beverage   PASAL DEVELOPM Real Estate 
ELLAKTOR S.A. Construction and Materials   PC SYSTEMS SA Technology 
ELVE SA Personal / Household Goods   PEGASUS PUBLISHING Media 
EMPORIKOS DESMOS Personal / Household Goods   PERFORMANCE TECHNOLO Technology 
EUROCONSULTANTS SA Industrial Goods & Services   PLASTIKA KRITIS SA Chemicals 
EURODRIP SA Chemicals   PROFILE SYSTEMS Technology 
EUROMEDICA Health Care   RIDENCO HOLDING SA Personal / Household Goods 
FLEXOPACK SA Industrial Goods & Services   S & B INDUSTRIAL Basic Resources 
FOLLI FOLLIE Retail   SELONDA SA Food & Beverage 
FORTHNET SA Technology   SFAKIANAKIS SA Retail 
FOURLIS SA Personal / Household Goods   SIDMA SA Basic Resources 
FRIGOGLASS S.A. Industrial Goods & Services   SPACE HELLAS SA Technology 
GR. SARANTIS S.A. Personal / Household Goods   SPIDER METAL INDUSTR Industrial Goods & Services 
HELLENIC FISHFARMING Food & Beverage   THRACE PLASTICS SA Chemicals 
HELLENIC PETROLEUM Oil & Gas   TITAN CEMENT CO. Construction and Materials 
HERACLES G CEMENT Construction and Materials   UNIBIOS HLDG Construction and Materials 
IKTINOS HELLAS SA Construction and Materials   ALPHA GRISSIN S.A. Technology 
IMPERIO ARGO GROUP Industrial Goods & Services   IMAKO MEDIA S.A. Media 
INFOQUEST SA Technology   SINGULARLOGIC Α.Ε. Technology 
INFORM LYKOS Industrial Goods & Services   NAFTEMPORIKI PUBL S.A. Media 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
